Trade Union Membership in Georgia: Roughly One in Six Employees — and Why Organisation Still Matters

GILS Research Team

Editor: Prof. Giorgi Pkhakadze, MD, MPH, PhD

Georgian Institute of Labour Studies · GILS Analysis

11 August 2026

Georgia does not publish an official trade union density statistic. Using the membership figure reported by the Georgian Trade Unions Confederation and Geostat’s count of hired employees, GILS estimates an upper bound of roughly 16% — about one employee in six. This analysis argues that density is only part of the problem: Georgian unions are also fragmented, unevenly represented in national institutions, and operate under weak practical protection against anti-union discrimination.

1. Introduction

Trade union density — the share of employees who are union members — is one of the standard indicators of workers’ collective bargaining capacity. Where density is high, unions can negotiate wages and conditions on behalf of large parts of the workforce. Where it is low, wages are set primarily by individual negotiation and market conditions.

In Georgia this indicator is unusually hard to pin down. This analysis therefore has two aims: first, to construct a transparent, evidence-based estimate of union density from available sources; and second, to examine why the figure matters. Our argument is that low density in Georgia is compounded by three structural weaknesses — fragmentation, unequal institutional representation, and weak protection — and that these together explain more about workers’ bargaining position than membership numbers alone.

2. Data and Method

Geostat’s regular labour force releases do not include union membership. International databases rely on figures supplied by national organisations. We therefore estimate density as:

Union density (upper bound) = reported union members ÷ hired employees

For the numerator we use GTUC’s reported membership of around 150,000, as cited in 2024 (OC Media, 2024; ITUC Projects Directory). For the denominator we use Geostat’s count of 958,400 hired employees in the fourth quarter of 2023 (Geostat, reported by 1TV, 2024).

This is an upper-bound estimate for three reasons. The membership figure is self-reported and not independently audited. It may include members who are no longer in employment. And it is compared with hired employees only, whereas some members may be self-employed. Members of unions outside GTUC are not included, which pushes slightly in the opposite direction; however, these unions are small.

3. Findings

3.1 Roughly one employee in six

Note that roughly 31.5% of employed people in Georgia are self-employed (Geostat, 2025). These workers fall outside traditional union structures entirely, so the share of the total workforce that is unionised is lower still.

3.2 The 2006 Labour Code and membership loss

The 2006 Labour Code was one of the most deregulated in Europe at the time of its adoption, and GTUC complained to the ILO on several occasions about its effects on freedom of association. In 2012 the ITUC reported GTUC’s estimate that union membership had fallen by more than 100,000 since the Code’s adoption, attributing the decline to the lack of protection against anti-union discrimination. The same report noted that although anti-union discrimination was prohibited in law, courts did not apply these provisions in practice (ITUC, 2012).

Amendments adopted in 2013 aligned the Labour Code more closely with international labour standards (ILO, n.d.). GTUC itself notes that amendments from 2012 onward created better conditions for the development of the trade union movement (GTUC, n.d.). The legal environment has improved; membership has not recovered to earlier levels.

3.3 Fragmentation and representation

GTUC is the dominant union body, but it is not the only one. The New Confederation of Independent Unions was founded on 20 January 2020 by three independent unions — Ertoba 2013 (Tbilisi metro workers), the Social Workers’ Union and the Solidarity Network (Publika, n.d.). It is not a member of the Tripartite Social Partnership Commission, whose worker side consists of GTUC (FES, n.d.).

Researchers have also documented the presence of so-called “yellow” unions — organisations formally registered as unions but not independent of employers — and a generally hostile public perception of trade unions, alongside very low membership (CELSI, n.d.). Fragmentation of this kind weakens the movement twice: it divides the membership base, and it allows governments and employers to question which organisations legitimately represent workers.

4. Discussion

Argument: low density leaves wage-setting to the market

In most European economies, workers’ bargaining power rests on two pillars: collective bargaining and a statutory minimum wage. In Georgia both are weak. The private-sector minimum wage has been fixed at GEL 20 per month since 1999 and is not a meaningful floor. With union membership covering at most one employee in six, there is no strong collective mechanism to substitute for it. The practical result is that wages for most workers are set individually, which systematically favours employers in labour markets with high underutilisation.

Counter-argument: membership is not the only source of union influence

Union power does not depend on density alone. Unions can influence policy through legislation, litigation, international pressure and public campaigns, and GTUC has used all of these — including complaints to the ILO, legislative initiatives on the minimum wage, and proposals during the 2020 Labour Code reform to add general and solidarity strikes to the Code (OC Media, 2024). The 2013 amendments show that such channels can produce real change.

We accept that these channels matter. But they are most effective when backed by a credible membership base. A union body representing a small and declining share of employees is easier for government and employers to discount. Institutional influence and membership are complements, not substitutes.

Counter-argument: unions’ own credibility problem

A second objection is that unions bear part of the responsibility for low membership — through Soviet-era institutional legacies, limited transparency, or perceived political caution. During the political crisis of late 2024, for example, Georgia’s largest unions remained largely silent on calls for a general strike, and opinions within GTUC itself were divided (OC Media, 2024). This criticism deserves to be taken seriously. Independently audited membership figures, transparent finances and active representation at workplace level would strengthen unions’ claim to speak for workers.

5. Limitations

The central estimate rests on a self-reported membership figure that cannot be independently verified, and on a denominator from a different period. Membership of non-GTUC unions is not quantified. No reliable official data on collective bargaining coverage were available for this analysis, so the relationship between membership and coverage cannot be tested. These are not minor caveats: they reflect the absence of official measurement, which is itself one of our findings.

6. Conclusion

On the best available evidence, at most about one hired employee in six in Georgia is a member of the main trade union confederation, and the true figure is probably lower. Low membership, organisational fragmentation, exclusion of independent unions from national dialogue, and weak practical protection against anti-union discrimination reinforce one another. Without an effective minimum wage, this leaves most Georgian workers negotiating alone. The first step towards changing this is measurement: a country cannot strengthen social dialogue it does not measure.

GILS analyses are prepared with AI-assisted drafting. All figures and claims are verified against the cited primary sources and reviewed under the responsibility of the Editor.