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Home/News & Analysis/AI, Skills and Young Workers in Georgia: What the ILO’s 2026 Evidence Says — and What It Doesn’t

AI, Skills and Young Workers in Georgia: What the ILO’s 2026 Evidence Says — and What It Doesn’t

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The ILO’s 2026 reports identify the accelerating adoption of artificial intelligence as one of the risks facing labour markets, while finding that AI-specific skills are still a small part of what employers ask for. For Georgia, where young people already face high unemployment and widespread overeducation, the question is how AI will affect their entry into work — and what skills policy should do now. This brief sets out what the evidence says and what it does not.

Key Points

  • The ILO’s Employment and Social Trends 2026 lists the accelerating adoption of AI among the risks that could worsen the labour market outlook (ILO, 2026a).
  • The ILO’s 2026 skills report finds that AI-specific skills still make up a small share of skill demand; most workers use AI tools that rely on basic digital, critical-thinking and social skills (ILO, 2026b; Nordic Labour Journal, 2026).
  • Earlier ILO research estimated that generative AI could augment at least 13% of employment worldwide — augmentation rather than replacement being the more likely effect for most jobs (ILO, 2023).
  • Young Georgians enter a difficult labour market: youth unemployment (ages 15–24) was 32.0% and the NEET rate 17.6% in 2025, and 36% of young workers were overeducated for their jobs in 2024 (Geostat; IMF, 2026).
  • There is no official data on AI use in Georgian workplaces — a gap that should be filled before policy is designed.

1. What the ILO Says About AI

The ILO’s position is cautious and evidence-based. Employment and Social Trends 2026 includes AI among the risks — alongside trade uncertainty and high sovereign debt — that “could deteriorate the labour market outlook should they materialize” (ILO, 2026a). The ILO’s skills portal cites its 2023 finding that generative AI could augment at least 13% of employment worldwide (ILO, 2023). And the 2026 lifelong learning report finds that employers mostly seek broad skill combinations rather than specialist AI skills (ILO, 2026b).

2. Young Georgians’ Starting Point

Young people in Georgia’s labour market (%)Young people in Georgia’s labour market (%)0%11.2%22.5%33.8%45%32%Youthunemployment (2025)18%Youth NEETrate (2025)36%Young workersovereducated (2024)Sources: Geostat (youth = ages 15–24; unemployment = GILS calculation from Geostat age-group data); IMF (2026).
Figure 1. Young people in Georgia face high unemployment and overeducation.

Georgian youth unemployment fell from 39.4% in 2020 to 32.0% in 2025, but, as GILS has shown, partly because fewer young people took part in the labour market. More than one in six young people aged 15–24 (17.6%) were not in employment, education or training, and many of those in work hold qualifications above their job’s requirements (Geostat; IMF, 2026).

3. What This Means for Georgia

Entry-level work

If AI tools change routine tasks in office and service jobs, the entry-level roles through which graduates start their careers may change first. In Georgia, where many graduates already work below their qualification level, this could deepen the mismatch — or, if skills policy responds, help young workers move into more productive roles. Without Georgian data, the balance cannot yet be measured.

Skills, not specialist AI training alone

The ILO’s finding that employers value combined digital, cognitive and social skills suggests that Georgia’s priority should be broad digital literacy and lifelong learning rather than narrow AI courses. Georgia’s vocational system already makes digital skills mandatory in all programmes (ETF, 2024); the gap is adult learning.

4. Counter-argument

Predictions about AI and jobs are highly uncertain, and some economists argue that earlier waves of technology ultimately created as much work as they changed. Policy built on speculative forecasts could misdirect scarce resources. This is why measurement should come first.

5. Conclusion

For young Georgians, AI is one more uncertainty in an already difficult transition to work. The evidence supports broad skills and lifelong learning, careful monitoring, and attention to entry-level jobs — not alarm.

GILS Recommendations

  1. Measure AI use at work: add questions on AI and digital tools to Geostat’s enterprise and labour force surveys.
  2. Prioritise broad digital and transferable skills in vocational, higher and adult education.
  3. Monitor graduates’ first jobs through tracer studies, to detect changes in entry-level employment.
  4. Involve social partners in decisions about workplace AI adoption.

GILS Position

Georgia should prepare young people for AI through broad skills and lifelong learning, and should measure before it legislates.

References

  1. ILO (2026a). Employment and Social Trends 2026. doi.org/10.54394/AHRT2681
  2. ILO (2026b). Lifelong learning and skills for the future. doi.org/10.54394/00033011
  3. Nordic Labour Journal (2026). New ILO report: More investment in lifelong learning needed. nordiclabourjournal.org
  4. ILO (2023). Generative AI likely to augment rather than destroy jobs. ilo.org
  5. IMF (2026). Georgia: Selected Issues. Country Report No. 26/134. imf.org
  6. PMCG Research (2025). Labor Market Overview: Georgia, Issue 151. research.pmcg-i.com
  7. European Training Foundation (2024). Torino Process: Georgia 2024. etf.europa.eu

Suggested citation: GILS Research Team (2026). AI, Skills and Young Workers in Georgia. Editor: G. Pkhakadze. Georgian Institute of Labour Studies, Tbilisi. labour.edu.ge

GILS analyses are prepared with AI-assisted drafting. All figures and claims are verified against the cited primary sources and reviewed under the responsibility of the Editor.

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