Remittances Are Holding Georgia Together — But For How Long?

GILS Research Team

Editor: Prof. Giorgi Pkhakadze, MD, MPH, PhD

Georgian Institute of Labour Studies · GILS Analysis

2 October 2026

Remittances have long been one of Georgia’s largest sources of foreign income. Between 2021 and 2024 their composition changed dramatically: transfers from Russia surged five-fold in 2022 and then collapsed, while transfers from the European Union and the United States grew steadily. This analysis argues that the headline decline in remittance dependence hides a structural shift — from volatile, crisis-driven flows towards durable flows tied to the long-term emigration of Georgian workers — and that this makes remittances a labour market issue, not only a macroeconomic one.

1. Introduction

For two decades remittances have been a pillar of household income in Georgia. They finance consumption, education and housing, and they cushion families against unemployment and low wages at home. The World Bank has ranked Georgia among the world’s more remittance-dependent economies (cited in JAMnews, 2023).

But remittances are not a single, stable flow. They respond to wars, sanctions, exchange rates and migration policies in destination countries. This analysis asks how the composition of remittances to Georgia changed between 2021 and 2024, and what the change means for the Georgian labour market. Our thesis is that the decline in headline dependence is less reassuring than it appears: the volatile, Russia-driven component has largely disappeared, while the durable component — earnings sent home by Georgians working long-term in the EU, the United States and Israel — has grown. That component is inseparable from the emigration of working-age Georgians.

2. Data and Definitions

Two related but different statistics are used. The National Bank of Georgia (NBG) publishes monthly data on money transfers received through banks and money transfer operators, broken down by sending country. The balance of payments measures personal remittances, which include compensation of employees and personal transfers between households. The two series differ in coverage, so this analysis uses money transfers for the country breakdown and personal remittances for the share of GDP. Neither series identifies who sends the money or why — a limitation that matters for interpreting the 2022 surge.

3. Findings

3.1 The Russia spike and its reversal

Russia’s share of money transfers to Georgia had been falling for a decade, from 54% in 2013 to 18% in 2021, as transfers from other countries grew (FactCheck Georgia, 2025). In 2022 the trend reversed abruptly. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and, later, partial mobilisation, large numbers of Russian citizens relocated to Georgia, and transfers from Russia rose to over USD 2 billion — 47% of the total (JAMnews, 2023). Russia’s share remained unusually high for five consecutive quarters before falling to 14.2% in the third quarter of 2024 (FactCheck Georgia, 2024).

The PMC Research Center suggested at the time that a significant part of these transfers reflected currency operations — rubles sent to Georgia, converted to dollars and moved back — rather than migrant earnings (cited in JAMnews, 2023). Whatever the precise mix, the 2022 surge was not primarily about Georgian workers abroad.

3.2 The durable flows are growing

In 2024, total transfers fell to USD 3.36 billion, but the decline was driven almost entirely by Russia. Transfers from the United States rose 24%, from Germany 15%, from Italy 8% and from Greece 7%, and EU countries as a group became the primary source, with growth of 10.2% (NBG, via 1TV, 2025). These are countries with large, established Georgian labour migrant communities, many working in care, domestic work, construction and services.

Source: World Bank data compiled by TheGlobalEconomy.com. 1997–2024 average: 10.1%.

The ratio to GDP has fallen partly because remittances fell and partly because GDP grew rapidly. Even so, at around 12% of GDP in 2024, remittances remained above their long-run average of about 10%.

4. Discussion

Argument 1: Falling dependence is mostly a statistical unwinding

The decline in remittance dependence since 2022 does not mean that Georgian households rely less on relatives abroad. It means that an exceptional, largely non-labour flow from Russia has unwound. Measured against 2021 rather than 2022, transfers from Western destinations have grown, not shrunk.

Argument 2: Durable remittances are the mirror image of emigration

Flows from the EU, the United States and Israel reflect the earnings of Georgians who have left the domestic labour market, often for many years. Research on Georgian youth shows that a considerable number of young unemployed people left the country between 2020 and 2023 (PMCG Research, 2024). Remittances from these workers support households at home, but the workers themselves are lost to Georgian employers, the tax base and the pension system. A rising share of stable remittances is, in this sense, a symptom of a labour market that does not retain its workers.

Argument 3: Remittances substitute for missing protection

ILO analysis shows that informal workers in Georgia rely heavily on support from family members to compensate for low earnings (Pignatti, 2026). Remittances are part of this family-based safety net. In a country without unemployment insurance and with a minimum wage of GEL 20, transfers from relatives abroad perform functions that social protection performs elsewhere.

Counter-argument: remittances are simply good for Georgia

Remittances reduce poverty, finance education and smooth consumption, and transfers from EU countries are less exposed to geopolitical shocks than transfers from Russia. These benefits are real, and the shift towards Western sources makes the inflow more stable. The point is not that remittances are harmful, but that they should be understood as the income side of emigration. A policy that celebrates the inflow without addressing why workers leave treats the symptom as the solution.

5. Limitations

Money transfer data do not identify the sender’s nationality, occupation or migration status, so the share of transfers coming from Georgian labour migrants cannot be measured directly. The 2023 value for Russia is derived from reported 2024 data. Personal remittances and money transfers use different definitions and should not be compared directly.

6. Conclusion

Georgia’s remittance inflows have become less volatile and more Western-oriented since 2022. That is welcome. But the durable part of the flow is the earnings of Georgians who work abroad, and its growth reflects continued labour emigration. Remittances will continue to hold many Georgian households together. Whether that is a strength or a dependency depends on whether Georgia can build a domestic labour market that offers its workers a reason to stay — or to return.

GILS analyses are prepared with AI-assisted drafting. All figures and claims are verified against the cited primary sources and reviewed under the responsibility of the Editor.