Georgia is both a major labour emigration country and a growing destination for migrant workers. This tool tracks outflows by destination, remittance flows, return migration, and the legal framework governing labour migration.
Georgia has experienced sustained labour emigration for over 30 years. Estimates suggest approximately 750,000 Georgians live abroad — roughly 20% of the pre-migration population. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine triggered the largest single emigration wave since independence, as hundreds of thousands of Russians and Ukrainians transited through Georgia — simultaneously pushing some Georgians to seek work elsewhere.
| Destination Country | Est. Georgians Abroad | Remittances (2024) | YoY change | Primary occupations |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Russia | ~220,000 | ~$998M | -8% | Construction, trade, domestic work |
| Turkey | ~95,000 | ~$210M | +3% | Seasonal agri, hospitality, domestic |
| Greece | ~80,000 | ~$185M | +5% | Domestic care, hospitality, agri |
| Italy | ~70,000 | ~$165M | 0% | Domestic work, care sector |
| Germany | ~45,000 | ~$124M | +12% | Healthcare, IT, engineering |
| Ukraine | ~35,000 | ~$38M | -52% | Trade, construction (pre-2022) |
| USA | ~30,000 | ~$110M | +8% | IT, professional services |
| Spain | ~28,000 | ~$68M | +1% | Domestic work, hospitality |
| Other / unknown | ~147,000 | ~$1,044M | — | Mixed |
| TOTAL | ~750,000 | ~$2.94B | −2% from 2023 | — |
Estimates based on: Geostat population projections, National Bank of Georgia (NBG) remittance data by sending country, IOM Georgia country profiles, and Embassy consular registration data. Russia decline in 2024 reflects some return migration and payment system disruptions due to sanctions. Ukraine figure collapsed after the 2022 invasion.
Remittances are a critical macroeconomic input for Georgia. At ~11.8% of GDP in 2024, they exceed FDI inflows and represent a vital income source for hundreds of thousands of households — particularly in rural regions where local employment is limited.
| Year | Total Remittances (USD M) | % of GDP | YoY change | Key driver |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2010 | $873M | 13.2% | — | Post-crisis baseline |
| 2012 | $1,047M | 11.8% | +10% | Growth in Russia corridor |
| 2014 | $1,358M | 11.5% | +15% | Peak Russia corridor (pre-ruble crisis) |
| 2016 | $1,192M | 10.8% | -12% | Ruble devaluation reduced USD value |
| 2018 | $1,492M | 12.0% | +11% | Recovery; Turkey, Greece growth |
| 2019 | $1,686M | 12.5% | +13% | Pre-COVID peak |
| 2020 | $1,580M | 12.8% | -6% | COVID — Georgian workers returned |
| 2021 | $1,960M | 14.2% | +24% | Post-COVID recovery |
| 2022 | $3,620M | 18.4% | +85% | Russian capital/worker flight through Georgia |
| 2023 | $2,988M | 13.1% | -17% | Correction after 2022 Russian spike |
| 2024 | $2,940M | 11.8% | -1.6% | Stabilisation; some Russia decline |
The 2022 spike (+85%) was driven not by Georgian emigrant remittances but by capital transfers from Russian nationals moving funds through Georgian banks to avoid sanctions. NBG data distinguishes "remittances" from "transfers" — the above figures include all international personal transfers. Corrected emigrant remittances from Georgians abroad were approximately $1.8-2.0B in 2022.
Georgia is increasingly a destination country, particularly since 2022 when a large influx of Russian and Ukrainian nationals arrived — some as temporary residents, some as long-term workers. Work permit data significantly undercounts the true number, as nationals of many countries can work in Georgia without a permit for up to 365 days.
Work permit data from the Ministry of Economy of Georgia. These figures cover formal work permits only. Russians and EU citizens can work without permits for extended periods; actual numbers are estimated at 2-3x higher. The large Russian/Ukrainian presence since 2022 has significantly altered Georgia's labour market, particularly in Tbilisi's IT, finance, and hospitality sectors.
Georgia has seen significant return migration in waves since the 2008 crisis. The COVID pandemic triggered a large temporary return (2020), and there has been ongoing interest in returning among diaspora, particularly from Russia following the 2022 invasion. However, sustained return is limited by the mismatch between skills acquired abroad and labour market demand in Georgia.
| Period / Wave | Est. Returnees | Driver | Reintegration outcome |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2008–2009 (financial crisis) | ~45,000 | Crisis in host countries (Russia, EU) | High unemployment on return; many re-emigrated by 2011 |
| 2014–2015 (Russia ruble crisis) | ~28,000 | Ruble collapse; reduced purchasing power | ~60% re-emigrated within 2 years (IOM) |
| 2020 (COVID-19) | ~65,000 | Border closures; job loss abroad | ~70% returned abroad after 2021 reopening |
| 2022– (Russia sanctions) | ~30,000 | Sanctions impact on Russian employers of Georgians | Mixed; some permanent return, some re-routing via Georgia |
| Ongoing circular migration | ~20,000/yr | Seasonal patterns (Turkey, Greece agriculture) | Regular seasonal cycle; limited permanent return |
IOM Georgia tracks return migration through reception support programmes. The State Commission on Migration (Prime Minister's Office) coordinates reintegration policy, but a comprehensive reintegration benefit system does not yet exist. See Law on Labour Migration.
| Sector | Emigration pressure | Key destination | Impact on Georgia |
|---|---|---|---|
| Healthcare (doctors, nurses) | Very High | Germany, Greece, UK | Rural doctor shortages; specialist deficits |
| IT and software engineering | High | Germany, Netherlands, USA | Partly offset by inbound Russian IT workers |
| Engineering and construction management | High | Russia, UAE, Germany | Construction sector management gaps |
| Education (secondary, tertiary) | Moderate | Russia, Turkey, EU | Teacher shortages in science and maths |
| Unskilled and semi-skilled labour | Moderate | Turkey, Greece, Russia | Agricultural and domestic labour shortages |
Georgia has bilateral labour migration agreements with Greece (2008), Italy (provisional), and Poland (2021) that provide some legal protections for Georgian workers. There is no agreement with Russia or Turkey, which together account for the majority of Georgian emigration. The Law on Labour Migration (2015) requires migrant worker contracts to meet minimum standards, but enforcement abroad is practically impossible. See Law on Labour Migration.
Foreign workers in Georgia are covered by the Labour Code equally with Georgian citizens — there is no special category of "migrant worker" with lesser rights. Work permits are required for nationals of most countries beyond 365 days. However, enforcement of labour rights for undocumented workers is weak, and the Labour Inspection Department has no special mandate for migrant worker protection. See Labour Inspection Law.
Georgia is a Tier 1 country in the US State Department TIP Report — the highest ranking for anti-trafficking efforts. However, the ILO and IOM identify ongoing risks for Georgian domestic workers in the Gulf states (Saudi Arabia, UAE), where kafala-system employment ties workers to specific employers and restricts freedom of movement. Approximately 5,000-8,000 Georgians are estimated to work in the Gulf under these conditions.
Georgia's funded pension system (launched 2019) does not currently have portability agreements with any country, meaning emigrants lose their pension accrual while abroad. Georgia has social security agreements with 13 countries covering pension rights for longterm emigrants, but most bilateral agreements predate the funded pension system and do not cover it. This is a significant gap affecting hundreds of thousands of Georgians.
Georgia occupies a unique position in migration: simultaneously a major emigration country (approximately 1.5 million citizens abroad — 35% of the resident population) and an increasingly significant immigration destination. The 2022-2023 influx of Russian and Ukrainian nationals following Russia's invasion of Ukraine transformed the immigration picture almost overnight, with registered foreign workers increasing from ~18,000 to ~45,000 in 24 months.
Remittances reached GEL 9.8 billion (USD 3.6B) in 2023 — 13.7% of GDP — making Georgia one of the most remittance-dependent economies in Europe. This creates both a structural economic cushion (reducing current account sensitivity to export shocks) and a long-term vulnerability (remittances decline if emigrant populations naturalise abroad or return home).
Georgia's migration story is not primarily a legal story — it is an economic story. 1.5 million citizens abroad and 13.7% GDP in remittances tells us that Georgia's domestic economy has not created enough formal jobs at wages that justify staying. The migration management law is a reasonable framework. But without accelerated domestic employment creation and wage growth, the framework manages decline rather than drives change. GILS advocates for migration policy to be integrated into the national employment strategy — not treated as a separate Home Affairs matter.
Georgia has no national migration strategy. Commission and adopt a five-year National Labour Migration Strategy by end 2025: covers emigration management, bilateral agreement expansion, returnee reintegration, immigration framework, and irregular migration. Coordinating body: inter-ministerial committee chaired by MLHSA. Without this document, migration policy is reactive and uncoordinated.
Moldova (National Migration Strategy 2022) · Armenia (Diaspora Engagement Strategy) · ILO migration policy guidanceGeorgia's ILO DCFTA commitments include ratification of C097 (Migration for Employment) and C143 (Migrant Workers). Parliamentary ratification by end of 2025 legislative session. Technical preparation by MLHSA is confirmed as complete. Ratification would extend protection to documented Georgian migrants in all ILO member states.
ILO C097 · ILO C143 · EU-Georgia DCFTA Chapter 13 roadmapCurrent paper-based work permit system creates 45-60 day processing delays deterring legal employment of foreign workers. Employer self-service portal: application, tracking, renewal. 10 working day processing guarantee. Integration with tax authority for contribution compliance monitoring. World Bank IFC TA has offered co-financing at 50%.
Estonia e-Residency model · Georgia gov.ge digital services · WB IFC TA Programme200,000-400,000 Georgians in irregular status abroad receive no consular protection. Georgian embassies in Russia, Turkey, Greece, and Italy to operate 'no questions asked' support lines: documentation assistance, access to healthcare, victim support for trafficking. Cost: GEL 800K annually across 5 key missions. Aligns with MFAEC consular strategy review 2024.
Philippines (POEA overseas protection) · Mexico (consular services for undocumented) · ILO C189 (domestic workers)Georgian diaspora estimated at USD 8B in accumulated savings abroad. GITA (Georgian Innovation and Technology Agency) to establish Diaspora Investment Fund: 1:1 co-investment match for diaspora-funded Georgian startups and SMEs, up to GEL 200,000. Target: 200 co-investments annually by 2027, creating 3,000 jobs. Moldova's PARE 1+1 programme: proven model, 12,000 returnees, 8,000 jobs created.
Moldova (PARE 1+1) · Armenia (Repat Armenia) · Ireland (Strategic Investment Fund diaspora tranche)| ILO Convention | Subject | Ratified | Compliance | Key Gap |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| C097 | Migration for Employment | Not ratified | n/a | Equal treatment for documented migrants not guaranteed in all countries |
| C143 | Migrant Workers (Supplementary) | Not ratified | n/a | No framework for irregular migrant protection |
| C181 | Private Employment Agencies | 2006 | Partial | Fee prohibition in law; enforcement weak; unlicensed agencies operate |
| C189 | Domestic Workers | Not ratified | n/a | Domestic workers (mostly female, often migrant) unprotected |