The Tripartite Commission: An Institution With a Mandate It Cannot Fulfil

Georgia’s Tripartite Commission has 27 members and meets quarterly — but lacks binding authority, a secretariat, and any mechanism to enforce its conclusions.

Georgia’s Tripartite Commission for Social Partnership was established by presidential decree in 2004 and given a legal basis in the Labour Code. It brings together representatives of the Government of Georgia, the Georgian Trade Union Confederation (GTUC), and the Georgian Employers Association (GEA) to discuss and negotiate on matters of labour policy, wages, and social protection. In principle, it is the central institution of Georgian social dialogue. In practice, it is one of the weakest tripartite bodies in the Eastern Partnership region.

The Commission’s structural deficits are well documented and largely acknowledged by its own members. It meets quarterly at best — and irregularly in practice, with meetings occasionally cancelled without rescheduled dates. It has no permanent secretariat: administrative support is provided by the Ministry of Labour on an ad hoc basis, which structurally undermines the independence and continuity of the body. It produces recommendations but has no mechanism to enforce them: neither the government nor the employers are legally bound to implement Commission conclusions. And its composition — 27 members, with government representatives outnumbering each of the social partner constituencies — gives the state a structural majority in any formal vote.

The contrast with effective tripartite institutions elsewhere in the region is instructive. Estonia’s Economic and Social Council, established in 2000, has a permanent secretariat, publishes annual reports, and operates on a consensus principle that gives each constituency effective veto power over Commission recommendations on a defined list of policy areas. Poland’s Social Dialogue Council, reformed in 2015, has a legal obligation imposed on the government to respond formally — with reasons — to any Council position within 30 days. Neither model is directly transplantable to Georgia’s institutional context, but both illustrate that functional social dialogue requires institutional architecture, not simply a meeting schedule.

The ILO’s Decent Work Country Programme 2024–2026 explicitly targets reform of the Tripartite Commission, committing to support a review of its mandate and the establishment of a dedicated secretariat. This is an unusual degree of directness for an ILO programme document, and it reflects the ILO Country Office’s assessment that the Commission’s current form is insufficient for the policy environment Georgia is entering. EU accession processes generate precisely the kind of complex, technically demanding tripartite negotiations — on minimum wage levels, working time directives, collective bargaining thresholds — for which Georgia’s current Commission is structurally unprepared.

GILS Position: The Georgian Institute of Labour Studies considers the reform of the Tripartite Commission to be a prerequisite for meaningful progress on labour policy in Georgia. Without an institution that social partners trust to produce binding outcomes, the negotiation of sensitive reforms — minimum wage, formalisation, OSH — will default to unilateral government action, which is slower, less legitimate, and more likely to produce policies that cannot be effectively implemented.

GILS recommends three immediate reforms: the establishment of a permanent Tripartite Commission secretariat with independent staff and a dedicated budget line in the state budget; amendment of the Labour Code to introduce a government obligation to respond formally to Commission conclusions within 60 days; and revision of the Commission’s composition rules to ensure parity between the government constituency and the combined social partners.

These changes do not require radical institutional innovation. They require political will to build the institutions that Georgia’s own commitments — to the ILO, to the EU, and to Georgian workers and employers — already demand.

Read the full GILS analysis: https://labour.edu.ge/tripartite-commission/